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COMMENTS
No Discretion, Heightened Tension:
The Tale of the Adoption and Safe Families
Act in New York State
SEAN D. RoNANt
Absent... individualized determination.. .children in state-
supervised foster care are subject to an arbitrary procedure that
leaves their fate to happenstance. Both the law and the courts owe
them more.'
INTRODUCTION
Foster care policy in the United States has struggled to
develop an effective system that both minimizes the time
children spend in foster care and maximizes their well be-
ing and safety. In 1997, in an effort to strike that balance,
Congress passed the most significant reforms since 19802 to
child welfare law, the Adoption and Safe Families Act (or
"ASFA").' In February of 1999, New York State finally
t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law,
May 2001. I would like to thank my family, John, Bernice (posthumously), and
Nora Ronan for their love and support. I would also like to thank Professor Su-
san Vivian Mangold for her tireless and invaluable guidance through the drafts
of this Comment.
1. In re Adoption of Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1999).
2. In that year, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act was passed
by Congress.




passed the state implementing legislation (or "NY-ASFA"4)
to comply with the federal reform and maintain federal
funding. The stated purpose of the federal legislation (and
thereby of the implementing legislation at the state level)
was to "[establish] unequivocally that our national goals for
children in the child welfare system are safety, permanency
and well-being."5 Specifically, the purpose of the federal
legislation was to "mandate that children's health and
safety... always be paramount concerns of the child wel-
fare system ..... ' This change "represents a significant
statement concerning the priorities of the child protection
system."7
The provisions in this legislation were designed to en-
sure, where possible, the safety of the child as well as to
avoid prolonged stays in foster care.8 Towards that end,
some of the key components of this legislation included an
automatic disqualification for individuals applying to be
foster or adoptive parents who have been convicted of any
one of enumerated violent crimes9 and the involuntary ter-
mination of parental rights under certain criterion. ° These
provisions on their face appeared entirely uncontroversial
and acceptable, but they instead proved to be inflexible
rules in a legal system in which the child welfare-domestic
4. Social Services, Family Court Act-Foster Care Placement, Procedure, ch.
7, § 56.1, 1999 N.Y. LAws 107 (amended July 11, 2000) [hereinafter Family
Court Act]. It should be noted that this Comment was drafted prior to recent
amendments made to NY-ASFA. Those subsequent amendments, which elimi-
nate the "irrebuttable presumptions" and reinstate judicial discretion, herald
what is discussed infra. The history of the New York law is prophetic both be-
cause of the lessons to be learned for future child welfare legislation, and be-
cause the federal legislation has not been similarly amended to date.
5. Cheryl J. Bradley, New York State's Adoption and Safe Families Act: An
Important Landmark in Child Welfare Law, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 1999, at 1; see
also Celeste Pagano, Recent Legislation: Adoption and Foster Care, 36 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 242, 244-45 (1999); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium:
The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83
MINN. L. REV. 637, 638-39 (1999).
6. In re Custody and Guardianship of Marino S., Jr., 693 N.Y.S.2d 822, 825
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999). The emphasis on child safety is specifically stated in the
federal act. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1997).
7. Roya R. Hough, Juvenile Law: A Year in Review, 63 Mo. L. REv. 459, 467
(1998).
8. Excessive stays in foster care have commonly been referred to as "foster
care limbo" or "drift."
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(a)(i) (Supp. IV 1998).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (Supp. IV 1998).
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violence tension is so pervasive. The consequence was a law
that disallowed judicial discretion to address the particular
circumstances of the biological or foster parent and denied
them and the children a fair and appropriate resolution.
This comment critically analyzes those provisions of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act and discusses the short-
comings of this legislation. Based on some of the early New
York case law that developed since the original NY-ASFA's
passage, the tension between child protection services and
protection of battered women continued. The struggles of
the system, and of judges forced to decide these cases, re-
vealed the ongoing lack of coordination of state and federal
statutes and agencies to address these two intertwined is-
sues. New York's recent amendments, seemingly contrary
to ASFA's mandates, reintroduces judicial discretion to al-
leviate this tension. This comment ultimately concludes
that the original ASFA, despite its well-intentioned re-
forms, has failed because it could not overcome that ten-
sion, and instead tragically perpetuates and worsens it.
Part I provides background on the lack of coordination
between child welfare and domestic violence services (and
the vexing problems thereby created for both) and lays out
the essential components of the federal act and the original
New York State implementing legislation. It also breaks
down the main provisions of the original state law creating
automatic disqualifications for foster and adoptive parents
and supplements the discussion with recent state cases
showing how the tension between domestic violence law
and child welfare law are perpetuated and brought about by
the law. Part II discusses the clause in ASFA originally
codified in NY-ASFA prohibiting judicial discretion based
on prior felony convictions. Part III examines an exception
to the New York state law which should have, but evidently
did not, carve out a workable exception to the child welfare-
domestic violence tension. Part IV examines the phenome-
non of terminating parental rights of battered mothers for
failure to protect their children from abuse and the failure
of ASFA to address it. Case law is provided here as well.
Part V discusses the role of judicial discretion in family law
and its changing role under ASFA. Part VI contemplates
what can be done to remedy these problems, suggesting




Government efforts to address domestic violence and
child welfare have traditionally been structured so as to
treat them in a segregated manner from each other. The
separate treatment of these two issues is systemic. For ex-
ample, funds for domestic violence and child welfare come
through separate "funding streams," and lawyers special-
izing in child welfare often work independently of those
specializing in domestic violence cases.' Despite a growing
awareness of the relationship between domestic violence
and child welfare, "the response of the courts tends to be
highly fragmented and often operates at cross-purposes, to
the detriment of battered women and abused children.""
. The counterproductive nature of these efforts is a well-
documented phenomenon. 3 "Too often, government and pri-
vate sector resources focused on prevention, intervention,
and treatment specifically respond to either child
abuse/neglect or domestic violence but not to situations
where the two may be found in tandem." 4 This problem is
perhaps best represented by the fact that states generally
have separate agencies to deal with child welfare and do-
mestic violence victims. 5 As an unfortunate consequence,
numerous reports have uncovered an alarmingly negative
perception among battered women of the legal system (par-
ticularly as it relates to their own children), with many of
them in fear of exposing the existence of domestic violence
in their families in court, receiving a reprisal from the
court, and having their children taken from them as a re-
sult of it. 6 Without a cohesive remedy to both of these
problems, government obviously risks helping neither bat-
tered women nor abused children adequately.
The American Bar Association articulated the dilemma
faced when balancing the need for child welfare protection
11. Howard A. Davidson, Child Abuse and Domestic Violence: Legal Connec-
tions and Controversies, 29 FAM. L. Q. 357, 360 (1995).
12. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: THE CITY'S
RESPONSE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE 40, in NATL CTR. ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW,
FAILURE TO PROTECT: A REFERENCE MANUAL FOR NEW YORK ATTORNEYS
REPRESENTING BATTERED WOMEN AT RISK OF LOSING THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR
FAILURE TO PROTECT THEIR CHILDREN FROM THE ABUSE (1993).
13. See generally NAT'L CTR. ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, supra note 12.
14. Davidson, supra note 11, at 359.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 358-59.
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and assistance for battered women:
Parents who are victims of domestic violence... often face a terri-
ble dilemma. If a mother with no financial resources flees the
home of her abuser, she may have no choice but to find shelter in a
setting that is not conducive to the health and welfare of her chil-
dren, thus facing child protective intervention. However, if she
recognizes her inadequate shelter choices and financial resources,
and tries to cope with the violence while remaining in the home
with an abuser, child protective services may charge her with
"failure to protect" her children and forcibly place them in foster17
care.
Tragically, past New York State case law shows the
"failure to protect" dilemma in particular to be an often-
repeated scenario. 8 Such circumstances best express the
degree to which laws addressing child welfare and domestic
violence (to the extent that they address it at all) are in ten-
sion with one another.
A. Introduction to ASFA
In light of appalling cases 9 which conveyed the sorry
shape of the child welfare system, the federal Adoption and
Safe Families Act sought to promote three fundamental re-
forms to the child welfare system:
First, ASFA would protect children's health and safety by ensuring
that states do not make so-called "reasonable efforts" to return fos-
ter children to dangerous households. Second, the Act would re-
duce "foster care drift," enabling children to return to their homes
or move to other permanent places more quickly. Third, ASFA
would increase the number of children moving from foster care to
17. HowARD DAVIDSON, ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, THE IMPACT
OF DOMEsTIc VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN 17 (1994).
18. See generally In re Alan G., 586 N.Y.S.2d 297 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992);
Dutchess County Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel Damien W. v. Donald W., 571
N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); In re F. Children, 577 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991); In re Tania J., 543 N.Y.S.2d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). The issue
of "failure to protect" cases in the context of the child welfare-domestic violence
tension is discussed more fully at infra Parts III, IV.
19. Perhaps the most infamous case in which the safety of children was so
blatantly ignored was that of Elisa Izquierdo, who in 1995 was tortured to
death by her own mother. This occurred in spite of the fact that the repeated
abuse was well known. Mary McGrory, At the Expense of Children, WASH. POST,





Congress made federal grant monies to the states con-
tingent on adopting changes to state laws on foster care.2
The original implementing legislation for ASFA in New
York State ("NY-ASFA"2 ') was passed on February 11, 1999,
and was praised by Governor George Pataki, who said in a
statement that it was part of an effort to "do everything we
can to insure children live in the safe, caring environment
they deserve."' The last state to pass the required reforms,
New York would have lost approximately $600 million in
federal funds had it not done so. 24 State government strug-
gled for months in Albany to reach an agreement on the act,
with politicians battling especially over the termination of
parental rights provisions.
In regards to the broader considerations of the state
legislature in passing this law, it declares in its findings
that "the state's first obligation is to help the family with
services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it if the child
has already left home."26 Clearly, the state sought to strike
a balance between the emphasis on preserving the child's
biological family articulated in the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 198027 and an urgent need to avoid
having children stay or be reunited with parents who mis-
treat them. "It is the intent of the legislature... to provide
procedures not only assuring that the rights of the natural
parent are protected, but also, where positive, nurturing
parent-child relationships that no longer exist, furthering
the best interests, needs, and rights of the child by...
freeing the child for adoption."28
20. Gordon, supra note 5, at 638-39 (footnotes omitted).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1)(B)(3) (Supp. IV 1999).
22. Family Court Act, supra note 4. "NY-ASFA" as it is used in this comment
refers to the provisions that were passed in February of 1999.
23. Clifford J. Levy, Leaders in Albany Back New Adoption and Foster Care
Rules, N.Y. TImEs, Feb. 9, 1999, at B6.
24. Id.
25. Id. In particular, Democrats sought to limit the state's power over ter-
mination of parental rights while Republicans (including Governor Pataki)
sought to expand that power. Id.
26. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384-b(1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000)
(amended July 2000).
27. See Pagano, supra note 5, at 244-45.




Senator Steve Saland, Chairman of the Senate Commit-
tee on Children and Families, stated in a press release that
"[t]his bill is designed to meet the goals enumerated in the
federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 to preserve
the health, safety and welfare of children in foster care. It
will bring tremendous benefits to New York's children with
the safe and permanent living environment they truly de-
serve."
The New York law, as originally passed in February
1999, stated that reasonable efforts to keep a child with his
or her parents shall not be required where a court deter-
mines that: (1) the parent of the child has subjected him or
her to "aggravated circumstances"; (2) the parent has been
convicted of murder in either the first or second degree of
another of his or her own children; (3) the parent has been
convicted of attempt of said crimes against another of his or
her own children; (4) the parent has been convicted of as-
sault in the second degree against the child in question or
another of his or her children; or (5) the parent had his or
her rights as to another child involuntarily terminated."
Other provisions in NY-ASFA included the establish-
ment of a comprehensive program to gather fingerprints of
prospective foster and adoptive parents, from which a
criminal record check will be obtained.0 Also, "permanency
hearings" were established whereby the "permanent plan"
of the foster child with an adoptive parent is determined."'
At the hearing, the court will consider whether the child
should be returned to the biological parents, be placed for
adoption and the biological parents' rights terminated, be
placed with a legal guardian, be permanently placed with a
"fit and willing relative," or be put in some other arrange-
ment to be determined by the Department of Social Serv-
ices."
The exceptions to "reasonable efforts" for reunification
do not explicitly consider domestic violence. A dangerous
possibility resulting from this awkwardly drafted provision
is that "parents who are perpetrators of domestic violence--
29. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.2(c)(1)-(6) (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000)
(amended July 2000).
30. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 378-a(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2000) (amended
July 2000).





who have assaulted or even killed the other parent or an
unrelated child-still may be entitled to reasonable efforts,
even if convicted."" The provisions relating to those pro-
spective foster or adoptive parents which make exceptions
for convictions of murder, manslaughter, and serious bodily
injury apply to only those cases in which the victim was the
child in question or another child of that same parent.34
This language exists in NY-ASFA as well, which states
that:
[Rleasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need from remov-
ing the child from the home of the child... shall not be required
where the court determines that:... the parent of such child has
been convicted of [any of the crimes outlined in "Terminating Pa-
rental Rights" above] and the victim was another child of the par-ent. 35
This comment will now critically analyze some of the
central components of NY-ASFA which contributed to the
tension between child welfare and domestic violence laws.
This analysis is important in highlighting the problems
with ASFA and with other states' implementing legislation.
PART II: FELONY PROVISION
The depth of the tension between domestic violence and
child welfare laws is illustrated in recent cases where appli-
cation of certain provisions of ASFA to formerly battered
women could create a tragic result in the child protective
services system. The particular provision at issue was codi-
fied in the New York Social Services Law.
Social Services Law Section 378-a(2)(e)(1) stated in
relevant part that:
[A]n application for certification or approval of a prospective foster
parent or prospective adoptive parent shall be denied where a
33. Bill Grimm, Adoption and Safe Families Act Brings Big Changes in
Child Welfare, YOUTH L. NEWS (Nat'l Center for Youth L., San Francisco, Cal.),
Nov.IDec. 1997, at 1.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(d) (1994).
35. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 358-a(3)(b)(2) (McKinney Supp. 2000). A serious
question raised by such statutory language is why such offenses need only have
been committed against the child in question or another child of the parent. At
this time, there does not appear to be any case law since NY-ASFA was passed
in which such a possibility was addressed.
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criminal history record of the prospective foster parent or prospec-
tive adoptive parent reveals a conviction for: (A) a felony convic-
tion at any time involving: (i) child abuse or neglect; (ii) spousal
abuse; (iii) a crime against a child, including child pornography; or
(iv) a crime involving violence, including rape, sexual assault, or
homicide, other than a crime involving physical assault or bat-
tery. 6
Further, Social Services Law section 378-a(2)(h) stated
that "[wlhenever a criminal history record of the foster par-
ent or prospective adoptive parent reveals a conviction for
one of the crimes set forth [above], such authorized agency
shall remove any foster child or foster children from the
home of the foster parent or prospective adoptive parent."7
These rules in effect created an "irrebuttable presumption"
38 of parental unfitness when a conviction for such a crime
existed. 9 Such a provision was facially acceptable, indeed
laudable, yet an examination of the compelling facts of two
child welfare cases reveals the dangers when such a nondis-
cretionary rule is implemented.
A scenario in which the prospective foster or adoptive
parent who was convicted of one of the enumerated offenses
did so under the fear of domestic abuse may not have been
entirely foreseen by the Legislature. Incredibly, however,
this exact scenario was repeated in New York State child
welfare proceedings at least two times in a mere six months
since the original NY-ASFA's passage. The results reached
in each of these two cases speak to both the inflexibility of
the original law and to the evident struggle by judges to
reconcile that flawed reform with the need to protect the
foster children and the mothers who are victims of domestic
violence.
In one proceeding in Kings County,40 a judge grappled
with this provision in the Social Services Law, yet boldly
made a defiant ruling. The facts of the case are as follows: a
middle-aged woman from Brooklyn ("Gwendolyn Grant"41)
36. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 378-a(2)(e)(1) (McKinney Supp. 2000) (amended
July 2000) (emphasis added).
37. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 378-a(2)(h) (McKinney Supp. 2000) (amended
July 2000) (emphasis added).
38. In re Adoption of Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1999).
39. This specific measure is codified in federal law at 42 U.S.C. §
671(a)(20)(A)(i)-(ii) (1999).
40. See Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
41. The court changed the proper names to protect the identity of the par-
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had raised four children, two of her own and two grandchil-
dren of a friend (of whom she obtained legal guardian-
ship).4 1 In 1991, Ms. Grant's sister was abusing drugs and
unable to care for her four young daughters.4 The sister
and her husband surrendered temporary custody of the
children, and Ms. Grant became their foster parent.44 They
later surrendered full custody in 1997, on the condition that
the girls be adopted only by Ms. Grant, who filed the peti-
tion to adopt the following year.
The issue in that proceeding before the judge was
whether NY-ASFA required an automatic denial of Ms.
Grant's adoption petition because she had been previously
convicted of manslaughter. That conviction stemmed from a
disturbing incident in December of 1977. At that time, Ms.
Grant was involved in a relationship with an abusive man.
One evening, while intoxicated, her boyfriend struck her in
the back of the head and smashed her forehead into a
kitchen cabinet. He also grabbed her by the throat and vio-
lently choked her. During the struggle, Ms. Grant grabbed
a carving knife from the counter to defend herself. He
lunged at her again and she fatally stabbed him in the
chest. As a result, Ms. Grant was convicted of manslaughter
but, in light of the nature of the offense, was only sentenced
to five years of probation, of which she served three.
Under NY-ASFA, this prior conviction for a violent fel-
ony constituted an automatic denial of her adoption appli-
cation. Since NY-ASFA applied retroactively,4 Ms. Grant's
prior acceptance as a foster parent would also be reversed,
and the children would also have been taken from her. In-
terestingly, the Attorney General for the State of New York
refused to defend the law in this case upon notification that
it was being legally challenged.48
Judge Segal attacked these provisions of the new law,
holding that such a "'one size fits all' procedure.., compels
an outcome so obviously damaging to the children's inter-
ties involved. Id. at 922 n.3.





47. Bradley, supra note 5.
48. Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
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ests."49 He held that NY-ASFA could not be constitutionally
applied to Ms. Grant's case as it would violate her constitu-
tional right of due process. 0 Further, permanently remov-
ing the children she sought to adopt would not be in their
best interest.5 ' The merciful outcome of this case is accom-
modating to the circumstances of the foster parent and to
the extreme circumstances that domestic violence brought
to bear. Significantly, it was achieved only through judicial
refusal to apply the original law.5"
Still another tragic example of the conflict between the
original felony provision of ASFA in New York State and
the tragedy of domestic violence exists. Not surprisingly,
the facts are highly similar to those of In re Jonee. A woman
(hereinafter referred to only as "Cynthia") in Upstate New
York has four young foster children, all boys with severe
developmental disabilities." Two of the young boys suffer
from Fetal Alcohol Syndrome.54 They have been in her care
ranging from four to seven years and share no biological
relation to each other.55
During a 1977 dispute with her then husband which
quickly grew violent, Cynthia shot and injured him. While
her attorney at that time felt certain that the charges would
be significantly lowered if she were to assert self-defense at
trial, they ultimately decided that she should not risk con-
viction of a higher felony by bringing the case to trial. As a
result, Cynthia took a plea from the district attorney for a
lesser felony.55 That plea agreement included a conviction of
an E Felony Assault, one year of probation, no jail time, and
a certificate of relief from disability." In addition, Cynthia
49. Id. at 925.
50. See id. at 925-26. The judge was referring to sections 378-a(2)(e)(1) and
(2)(h) of the original NY-ASFA.
51. See id. at 926.
52. The basis for the decision in this case is analyzed further at infra Part
III. Recent amendments concede the judge's demand for discretion.
53. All information regarding the case of "Cynthia" has been obtained via an





57. Id. A "certificate of relief from disability" is a relief from "civil disabili-
ties," which are defined as disabilities which "adversely affect an offender both
during his incarceration and after his release, including denial of such privi-
leges as voting, holding public office, obtaining many jobs and occupational li-
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also made a special plea arrangement in which the defen-
dant pleads guilty to the offense without confessing to the
crime. According to the attorney now assisting her with the
adoption petition, Cynthia "would have been crazy" not to
accept that plea arrangement.58
Yet in spite of these circumstances, Cynthia, like Ms.
Grant, risked having her application to adopt her four fos-
ter children automatically denied because of NY-ASFA
(namely, the same provision at issue in the previous case).
As in In re Jonee, the Attorney General decided not to de-
fend the statute. The county's position against Cynthia con-
sisted of no more than a statement that its denial of her ap-
plication was simply in accordance with NY-ASFA.
Testimony at the hearing included that of numerous people,
now adults, whom Cynthia had previously raised as a foster
parent.59 However, the hearing officer repeatedly pressed
Cynthia about the felony and about the possession of the
weapon used to shoot her husband."
Under the amended NY-ASFA, Cynthia's case is much
stronger. The new provisions, although not in agreement
with ASFA, now allow judges the discretion to equitably de-
cide cases such as hers. Should foster parents like Cynthia
ultimately lose their cases, the existing foster care system
in New York State may compound the tragedy. As in In re
Jonee, the retroactive nature of NY-ASFA would mean that
a denial of Cynthia's adoption application would now also
mean a retroactive denial of her original foster care applica-
tion, and the children would be taken from her. Moreover,
because her foster children are not biological brothers,
there is no statutory requirement that they be kept to-
gether by the Department of Social Services if removed
from Cynthia's home.6'
Wholly apart from the tragic dilemmas that these pro-
visions created in practice is the separate frustration over
the fact that there was considerable data on domestic vio-
lence 2 at the time of the passage of this legislation which
censes, [etc.] ... ." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 245 (6th ed. 1990). It is codified in
New York State law at N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 703 (McKinney 1987).




62. Arthur L. Kellerman & James A. Mercy, Men, Women, and Murder:
Gender-Specific Differences in Rates of Fatal Violence and Victimization, J.
[Vol. 48960
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highlights the phenomenon of women who either kill or
otherwise act in self-defense against their batterers. It has
frequently been found that when a battered woman attacks
or kills her abuser, it is done in self-defense." In fact, one
study found that homicides committed by women were
seven times as likely to be in self-defense as homicides
committed by men.' Other studies suggest that at least 40
percent of women who kill do so in self-defense.65 In fact,
some studies indicate that most women who kill and abu-
sive partner do so while they are being abused or threat-
ened with abuse.6 This is not to suggest that Congress or
the state legislature deliberately dismissed available statis-
tical evidence, 7 but the data plainly reveals how the well-
intentioned felony provision swept too broadly over an inor-
dinately complex issue.
Beyond compelling cases such as these where the bat-
tered woman defended herself against further abuse, an-
other way in which these provisions of NY-ASFA were too
broad was in circumstances in which the battered woman
abuses the children herself. Some abused mothers may be
abusive to the children "in efforts to control children's be-
havior in order to appease a volatile mate and to prevent
any disturbances that might cause the violent partner's
wrath and abusive behavior to escalate."68 Consequently,
even in circumstances where the battered mother was her-
self abusive, this should not be dispositive on the issue of
whether the children should be removed from her care, es-
pecially years after the domestic violence and subsequent
court proceedings have ended.
TRAUMA, July 1992, at 1, 3; Susan Madden, Fighting Back With Deadly Force:
Women Who Kill in Self-Defense, in FIGHT BACK 143, 144-45 (Frederique Dela-
coste & Felice Newman eds., 1981).
63. See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984);
ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1987); Christine E. Rasche,
Given Reasons for Violence in Intimate Relationships, in HOMICmE: THE
VICTIM/OFFENDER CONNECTION (Anna Wilson ed., 1993).
64. BROWNE, supra note 63, at 10.
65. ANN JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 320 (1980).
66. See generally Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498 (1993).
67. Indeed, the role of domestic violence in child welfare cases was expressly
contemplated. See infra Parts III & VI.
68. Davidson, supra note 10, at 368.
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PART III. THE ILLUSORY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXCEPTION
What makes these cases more frustrating still is the
fact that NY-ASFA, as originally constructed, included
what was conceivably an exception to its provisions for in-
stances of domestic violence. Among the convictions which
would result in an automatic denial of a foster care or adop-
tion petition is the crime of "spousal abuse."69 NY-ASFA de-
fines "spousal abuse"" as the physical, sexual or psychologi-
cal abuse of one's spouse and that "spousal abuse shall not
include a crime in which the applicant.., was the victim of
physical, sexual or psychological abuse by the victim of such
offense and such abuse was a factor in causing the prospec-
tive foster parent or prospective adoptive parent to commit
such offense." In other words, when the individual seeking
to adopt or become a foster parent has a conviction for a
crime which was essentially an act of self-defense against
an abusive spouse, the legislature seems to have been at-
tempting to have it fall outside the list of crimes for which
the automatic denial would apply. A determination on
whether the exception applies is to be made subject to a
hearing. 2
The inclusion of this exception is promising in terms of
addressing the child welfare-domestic violence tension '
and, more to the point, could have resolved entirely the
problems presented in the two previous cases without hav-
ing to amend the law. However, there were indications of
serious problems of applicability. In the one case already
decided on this issue, In re Jonee, the judge did not even
consider the provision at all. Instead, he decided only that
the original provisions of NY-ASFA, which dealt only with
the terms of the automatic denial itself, could not be consti-
tutionally applied to the facts of the case. '4 Granted, the
domestic violence exception does refer only to cases in
which the abuse was against a "spouse" and in the In re
69. N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAw § 378-a(2)j) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000).
70. Spousal abuse is an offense defined in the N.Y. PENAL LAW §120.05 and
§120.10.
71. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 378-a(2)(j) (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. However promising such an exception may be, it should be noted here
that an equivalent exception does not exist in the original federal Adoption and
Safe Families Act. See Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
74. In re Adoption of Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1999).
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Jonee case the abuser was Ms. Grant's paramour.7" Never-
theless, it is at least curious that the exception was not
even considered as indicative of legislative intent to create
an exception to the automatic disqualification for circum-
stances of domestic violence. The decision instead rested on
the reasoning that NY-ASFA was unconstitutional in the
context of this case76 and of the importance of an "individu-
alized determination" for each child welfare case. Neither
the outcome nor the rationale of In re Jonee is likely to be
seriously disputed, but the decision clearly fails to employ
language within the state law itself which, without even
having to reach due process issues, would have essentially
resolved the case.78
This provision of the original NY-ASFA providing for
automatic disqualifiers for prospective foster and adoptive
parents was a new twist introduced by ASFA on the tension
between child welfare and domestic violence laws. The re-
cent amendments to the law in New York may eliminate
this. However, a more frequent expression of that tension
lies in prosecuting battered women for failure to protect
their children against an abuser. New York State has grap-
pled with the issue again since the passage of NY-ASFA.
PART IV. TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS FOR "FAILURE TO
PROTECT"
Terminating parental rights of the mother in cases of
domestic violence, as discussed in Part I, is another indica-
tor of the struggle to balance the interests of the child with
the circumstances of the mother. "Termination of parental
rights is a drastic response to grave concerns about paren-
tal fitness," as it constitutes the "unmitigated cessation of
all natural and legal rights a parent has with a child, and a
permanent parting of all bonds linking parent to child."79
75. Id. at 921.
76. Id. at 926.
77. Id.
78. In Cynthia's case, the exception would be directly applicable since she
was married to her abuser. Yet, her case proceeded as far as a hearing on the
matter, and the county Department of Social Services challenged her petition.
Billingsley, supra note 53.
79. Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims: Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic
Violence on Children Through Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84
CAL. L. REV. 757, 765 (1996).
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In regards to the automatic termination of the parental
rights of the biological parent or parents, NY-ASFA
amended the Social Services Law to read as follows:
whenever.., the child shall have been in foster care... for fifteen
of the most recent twenty-two months; or a court of competent ju-
risdiction has determined the child to be an abandoned child; or
the parent has been convicted of [murder or manslaughter in the
first or second degree or attempt thereof against another child of
his or her own, criminal facilitation of said crimes, assault in the
first or second degree, or aggravated assault],... the authorized
agency having care of the child shall file a petition [to terminate
parental rights] pursuant to this section.
80
What was worrisome about the termination provision
was how it would be used in light of case law decided prior
to that provision's implementation. Specifically, the termi-
nation of the parental rights of a mother for failing to ade-
quately protect her child from abuse was a legal develop-
ment which had precedent in cases that preceded the
passage of ASFA at the federal and state levels.8 Increas-
ingly, mothers who are themselves victims of domestic vio-
lence face criminal charges for the failure to protect their
children from that violence."2 In many of those cases, the
mother was charged with the same offense as the father
(the one who actually committed the crime) for failing to
take action while the crime was being committed.83 In effect,
the mother is guilty of the assault or abuse as if she had di-
rectly conmitted it herself.
But there is evidence which indicates that "once freed
from an abusive relationship, battered women frequently
regain coping skills and establish normal lives."' In fact,
studies indicate that abused mothers who receive counsel-
80. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 384-b(3)(1)(i) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000)
(amended July 2000).
81. See, e.g., State ex rel. Human Serv. Dep't v. Dennis S., 775 P.2d 252
(N.M. Ct. App. 1989); In re Halamiuda, 192 P.2d 781 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
82. See generally THE "FAILURE TO PROTECT" WORKING GROUP OF THE CHILD
WELFARE COMMITTEE, N.Y. CITY INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, CHARGING BATTERED MOTHERS WITH "FAILURE TO PROTECT": STILL
BLAMING THE VICTIM 21 (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter BLAMING THE VICTIM]; Ann
Jones, Children of a Lesser Mom, LEAR's, May 1993, at 30.
83. See generally In re Alan G., 586 N.Y.S. 2d 297 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); In
re F. Children, 577 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); In re Lynelle W., 578
N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
84. Haddix, supra note 79, at 796.
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ing have as high as an eighty percent chance of leaving
their batterers and restoring a safe living environment for
themselves and their children, thereby avoiding the need
for termination of parental rights proceedings and the pros-
pect of foster care or adoption altogether. 5
There is one exception to this provision under NY-ASFA
which may overcome the statutory requirement that a ter-
mination petition be filed. The agency would not be re-
quired to file said petition if "the agency has documented in
the most recent case plan.., a compelling reason for de-
termining that the filing of a petition would not be in the
best interest of the child."86 This would seem to recognize
the possibility of extenuating circumstances, such as those
created by domestic violence. But a provision like this is
useless without providing adequate funding for services
that assist the parent in creating a safe and stable home for
the child. Indeed, it may be difficult for a parent to develop
such a safe environment if that parent cannot extricate her-
self from an unsafe environment. As will be explained in
the next section, funding for services to families was erratic
at best prior to ASFA, and it is unlikely to improve under it.
The termination of parental rights under ASFA based
on the previous termination of parental rights as to another
sibling is, like the felony provision, seemingly unobjection-
able,' but also risks an overbroad application which would
fail to recognize circumstances in which domestic violence
may have been a factor. "Reasonable efforts" to reunite a
child with the biological parents or parent is not required if
85. Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, supra
note 66, at 1617 n.149. Unfortunately, this study does not provide evidence as
to how long such rehabilitation normally takes. That information would be
critical to the possible revision of ASFA, especially in terms of the fifteen-month
cap (over a twenty-two-month period) on time which a child spends in foster
care. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (Supp. 1II 1997). If such rehabilitation
typically lasts for more than that specified time period, then ASFA is guilty of
yet another aggravation of the child welfare-domestic violence tension in the
law.
86. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 384-b(3)(1)(i)(B) (McKinney Supp. 2000). There
are now additional provisions which may also provide relief for victims of do-
mestic violence. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 378-a (McKinney Supp. 2000).
87. See generally Kathleen Haggard, Comment, Treating Prior Terminations
of Parental Rights As Grounds for Present Terminations, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1051
(1998) (arguing that termination of parental rights may be based upon a prior
termination of parental rights as to another child if it is determined that the
parent's behavior endangers the child).
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the parent in question has previously had their parental
rights terminated as to another child." This provision can
be extremely detrimental to mothers whose parental rights
were terminated for extenuating circumstances.
Provisions of ASFA concerning the termination of pa-
rental rights exacerbate the tension between child welfare
and domestic violence efforts in both hastening termination
and providing exceptions to termination of parental rights.
ASFA states that the termination of parental rights is not
required if "reasonable efforts" to reunify a biological family
have not been made." "The fairness to the parents is evi-
dent: the state cannot destroy legal bonds to children with-
out first offering services. But the exception also discour-
ages terminations at a time when they are often the best
option for children."9" Such times include when a child ends
up "drifting" in foster care until he or she is no longer adop-
table.9' Thus, the felony provision had negative conse-
quences at both ends: when it hastened termination as well
as when it provided an exception to termination.
A. Funding
The amount of funding provided and to whom it is dis-
tributed is as significant a component of the legislation as
the construction of the statutory language. Prior to ASFA,
the federal government had been criticized for its lack of
funding for or availability of services to families to assist in
preserving them and in keeping children with their biologi-
cal families.92 In the case of the federal ASFA, there are no
evident efforts to provide funding for any additional serv-
ices that would promote the preservation of the family and,
presumably concurrently, promote child welfare and reduce
domestic violence. However, "[i]n passing the ASFA,...
Congress chose not to respond directly to criticism directed
at a lack of funding for family preservation."93
Even assuming that ASFA statutorily mandated a
88. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (Supp. IV 1998).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 475(5)(E)(iii) (Supp. IV 1998).
90. Gordon, supra note 5, at 660.
91. Id. at 661 n.145.
92. Pagano, supra note 5, at 244 (citing Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey,
When Welfare Ends: Removing Children From the Home for Poverty Alone, 70




greater coordination of government efforts for child welfare
and domestic violence, present statistics indicate that it is
not likely that this would be successful without adequate
funding. "Family Court judges [in New York City] often
have forty to fifty cases on their docket each day. This huge
volume seriously hampers a judge's ability to make sound
assessments and decisions." 4 The Family Violence Task
Force cites to the small size of the staff in various agencies
involved as the reason why the court system inadequately
addresses many instances of domestic violence. This, in
turn, has the effect of discouraging battered women from
reporting crimes committed against them at all, and
thereby endangering their children and their custody
thereof." As was foretold in the congressional hearings on
ASFA, "to intensify the time lines for permanence, without
also intensifying services, seems a prescription for disas-
ter."96
Under NY-ASFA, the State Legislature appropriated
$3.5 million to implement the new laws to supplement the
federal monies supplied as a result of passing the legisla-
tion, of which $2.2 million was appropriated for state fund-
ing of the fingerprinting program for prospective foster and
adoptive parents.97 Five hundred thousand dollars was ap-
propriated to criminal justice services to provide the crimi-
nal record checks.98 Funds for training state and agency
employees were lumped together with funds appropriated
for "transportation and related costs" of having juvenile de-
linquents attend family court hearings." There is no men-
tion at all as to what this training will include, or if it im-
plies anything more than awareness of the changes in the
law.1
00
94. NATL CTR. ON WOMEN AND FAMmY LAW, supra note 12.
95. See Davidson, supra note 11, at 359.
96. Pagano, supra note 5, at 248 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 867 Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Mary Lee Allen, Children's Defense Fund)).
97. Family Court Act, supra note 4, ch. 7, § 57, at 137.
98. Id.






ASFA's means of expediting the foster care process in-
evitably involves the use of time limits. States are now re-
quired to commence proceedings to terminate parental
rights if a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the last
twenty-two months.'0 ' Besides the fact that the limit of fif-
teen months is not based on any research or evidence
showing it to be the most appropriate time frame, °2 time
limits themselves are problematic. This is especially true
with respect to services offered to protect the battered
woman herself and her children. Info on how long it takes.
"By specifying the point at which efforts should end instead
of requiring specific services, the new time limits may in
some circumstances split up families who would have had a
chance." 3 Focusing on when efforts to reunite a family
should end is clearly reflective of the stated goal of ASFA to
reduce the amount of time a child spends in foster care.
Providing services to essentially "see if they work" for the
biological parents would lengthen that time in foster care.
C. Philosophy
A primary motivation in implementing ASFA was to
correct a perceived overemphasis in the implementation of
the previous law regarding foster care (the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980), which was that the
preservation of the biological family was of paramount im-
portance.' 4 "The 1980 Act was based on the premise that
removal of a child from his or her home was so harmful to
his or her psyche that it was virtually never in the child's
best interests to be removed."' A major tenet, then, of the
1980 law was that "reasonable efforts" be required "to pre-
vent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his
home"'6 While the 1980 law failed to define exactly what
101. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(e) (Supp. IV 1994).
102. In fact, the use of a fifteen-month time frame is the product of political
haggling rather than of a reasoned conclusion. The House and Senate simply
"split the difference" in their proposals as to the proper time period to arrive at
fifteen months. Grimm, supra note 33, at 4.
103. Pagano, supra note 5, at 246.
104. See id. at 243, 244-45.
105. Id. at 243.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. II 1994).
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constituted "reasonable efforts," it did seem to imply that
some measure of services be made available to the family,
such as counseling, transportation, or assistance in the
home.0 7
With the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families
Act, the public policy on child welfare has shifted. "[T]he
ASFA fundamentally rejected the idea that family reunifi-
cation is always desirable, putting the child's immediate
safety, not his or her long-term mental health, at the fore-
front."' The New York State Assembly, however, asserted
in its memorandum which accompanied passage of NY-
ASFA that "[i]t does not represent a change in law, policy,
or emphasis in New York."' 9 As is evidenced by the case
law on NY-ASFA, the original amendments did represent at
least a change in emphasis evidenced by the automatic dis-
qualification provision, the result of which was the exacer-
bated tension between child welfare and domestic violence.
The legislative philosophy behind ASFA raises some
other concerns. In the federal act, Congress was careful to
emphasize that "the safety of the child to be served shall be
of paramount concern. NY-ASFA repeats this philosophy
in its statement of intent."' No one would doubt that the
safety of children should be at the core of the foster care
system, but such language (at least in the practice of these
laws) seems to isolate considerations too much. The circum-
stances of an individual family can and should be fully con-
sidered, and this can be done without compromising the
safety of the child. As stated in In re Jonee and affirmed in
the new amendments, the family court system owes the
child that consideration."
PART V: ERODING JUDICIAL DISCRETION
The focus of this note is on the effect of ASFA provisions
on the decision making capacity of family court judges who
107. Pagano, supra note 5, at 243.
108. Id. at 244-45.
109. N.Y. State Assembly, Memorandum in Support of Social Services,
Family Court Act-Foster Care Placement, Procedure, 1999 N.Y. Laws 1485,
1487.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(9) (Supp. III 1994).
111. "Ihe health and safety of children is of paramount importance." N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(a) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2000).
112. In re Adoption of Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1999).
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decide child welfare cases. Namely, the new law eliminates
(or at least attempts to eliminate) some of the discretion
that judges had in deciding these cases. A distinguishing
feature of family law, and the reason why such cases are so
difficult to adjudicate, is that reaching decisions in such
cases is factually based."' "Family law tries to regulate
people in the most complex, most emotional, most mysteri-
ous, most individual, most personal, most idiosyncratic of
realms.""' Nuances unique to each case can become critical
in determining the outcome. ASFA, by seeking to accelerate
the foster-care-to-adoption process, has eliminated some of
that discretion. The automatic termination of parental
rights and automatic application denials to foster and adop-
tive parents under the new law create irrebuttable pre-
sumptions in the law that allow no room for judicial discre-
tion.
It is promising that while ASFA originally strived to
create "automatic" consequences in child welfare law, the
characteristic discretion of family law judges continued in
New York State. The judge in In re Jonee considered all of
the evidence and reports on the parental fitness of "Mrs.
Grant" and found that "[i]n these circumstances, peti-
tioner's conviction cannot be dispositive" and then reiter-
ated a family law maxim to justify his decision: "[The only
absolute in the law governing custody of children is that
there are no absolutes.""' Despite this individual effort, the
original message of NY-ASFA was clear: an adoption peti-
tion shall be denied if the applicant has a prior conviction of
enumerated felonies and that parental rights shall be ter-
minated if certain criteria are met. The recent amendments
to NY-ASFA properly attempt to restore that hallmark dis-
cretion to family court judges; yet, ASFA's prohibition of
discretion remains as the federal mandate.
The effect of ASFA to remove some degree of discretion
of family court judges seems representative of a broader
trend. At the turn of the century, the role of the family
court judge was in its infancy and was readily endorsed,
even romanticized: The family court judge's role was
113. Carl E. Schneider, Symposium: One Hundred Years of Uniform State
Laws: Discretion, Rules and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest
Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2218-19 (1991).
114. Id. at 2218.
115. Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 925 (quoting Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432
N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1982)).
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deemed by its nature to be unconventional, with the appro-
priate setting being one in which the judge is "seated at a
desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occasion
put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to
him."'16 The depiction of a family court judge, and particu-
larly his or her discretion, has since dramatically shifted:
'Vesting judges with such discretion does not enhance their
ability to make just decisions; instead, it jeopardizes fun-
damental rights of parents and children."' 7 The Supreme
Court decision In re Gault..8 marked a philosophical change
away from unfettered discretion and toward creating a sys-
tem in which family courts were required to follow nearly
the same procedural guidelines as criminal courts.
"iH]istory has ... demonstrated that unbridled discretion,
however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor sub-
stitute for principle and procedure."
1 9
Even modified judicial discretion in family law cases
has not been without its detractors. 2 ' But the long use of
judicial discretion in family law has been a critical means of
addressing the unique problems families pose to the legal
system. "[D]iscretion has regularly shown itself necessary
in the kind of decisions family law involves."'' And in spite
of criticisms of the ad-hoc nature of some discretionary de-
cision making, it provides key advantages all of which are
of tremendous benefit to child welfare cases and to family
law in general.
Discretion gives the decision-maker the flexibility to do justice. It
does so not just by allowing a decision-maker to heed all the indi-
vidual facts which ought to affect a decision but that could not be
listed by rules. It also does so by allowing a decision-maker to see
over time how well a decision worked and to adjust future deci-
sions accordingly.
122
Discretion is also more conducive to sound judicial deci-
sions by discouraging overly bureaucratic ways of thinking,
since they are often born of too rigid an insistence on writ-
116. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909).
117. Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family
Law: The Child Support Experiment 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 210 (1991).
118. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
119. Id. at 18.
120. See Murphy, supra note 117, at 230-31.
121. Id.
122. Schneider, supra note 113, at 2247.
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ing elaborate rules and on following them with too me-
chanical a regularity. The new amendments to NY-ASFA
correctly restore that discretion.
That judicial discretion is being so limited by ASFA is
made all the more outrageous by the fact that the degree of
discretion required to determine the flaws of its provisions
is quite small. In fact, sheer common sense would seem to
have dictated the outcome in In re Jonee or in Cynthia's
case. Both women were defending themselves from a brutal
attack to preserve their safety and should not suffer the
grossly unjust consequence years later of being unable to
adopt the foster children they have devotedly cared for. The
judicial discretion being applied in the Jonee case, then,
simply allows the judge to do what is right for the parties
involved. If the child welfare-domestic violence tension in
the law is as pervasive as the fumbling of the ASFA sug-
gests, then hampered judicial discretion would likely only
intensify it.
What the flaws in ASFA and in the conflicting policies
in child welfare and domestic violence ultimately reveal is
quite simply a lack of justice - for both the children and
their mothers, whether biological, foster or adoptive.
The assumption here [when battered mothers are convicted for
failure to protect] is that the women allowed their boyfriends or
husbands to abuse and kill the children, that they had the power
to prevent the crime but failed to use it. It's an assumption that all
but wipes out the distinction between crimes of omission and
crimes of commission, between child neglect and child abuse be-
tween criminal negligence and deliberate, intentional murder. f23
These injustices obviously precede ASFA, but are evi-
dence that the new law risks worsening, however uninten-
tionally, that tension. "The law isn't supposed to punish
people for failing in duties they lack the capacity to per-
form."" That punishment, in addition to any criminal
charges or convictions which may be imposed on the
women, also includes the subsequent placement of the chil-
dren in foster care or the outright termination of their pa-
rental rights. Both ASFA and the child welfare system in
general thereby fail to rectify a central component of the
child welfare-domestic violence tension: '"e can't make the
121. Jones, supra note 82, at 30.
124. Id. at 32.
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world safe for children by making it ever more dangerous
for their mothers."25 A judge hearing the facts in family
court could be sure justice was served at least to the mother
and her kids. Failure to protect-difference between the
courts should be the ability to use discretion.
PART VI: WHAT CAN BE DONE?
[I]t's imperative that we really focus on the whole issue of domestic
violence and family violence in its larger context... . Courts and
child welfare agencies have an affirmative duty, before removal as
well as in the reunification decisions, to promote safety of the vic-
tim-parent (typically the mother) and her children. 26
It is clear that resolving the tension between domestic
violence and child welfare efforts will require more than the
recent revisions to NY-ASFA and any similar revisions to
the federal ASFA. But it is crucial that federal ASFA and
other state implementing legislation adopt, at a minimum,
these amendments reinstituting judicial discretion. Since
child welfare law, as has been shown, is often intercon-
nected with the issue of domestic violence, this legislation
may be an appropriate starting point for substantive re-
form.
A major development in that reform has already oc-
curred with the recent amendments to the New York im-
plementing legislation. The provision mandating the denial
of an application of a prospective foster or adoptive parent
of an individual charged with an enumerated felony has
now been qualified. Such a denial will not be made if the
prospective parent can demonstrate that "(i) such denial
will create an unreasonable risk of harm to the physical or
mental health of the child; and (ii) approval of the applica-
tion will not place the child's safety in jeopardy and will be
in the best interests of the child."2 This amendment clearly
restores the discretion to judges to determine whether
There are a number of revisions to the laws and legal
structures that would create vastly improved coordination
125. Id.
126. DAVIDSON, supra note 17, at 1, 18 (emphasis added) (quoting Attorney
General Janet Reno in Stephanie B. Goldberg and Henry J. Reske, Talking with
Attorney General Janet Reno, 79 A.B.A. J. 48 (June 1993)).
127. S. 7892, 223rd Leg., 2000 N.Y. LAWS 145.
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between these presently separated efforts. First, the inabil-
ity of ASFA to overcome any portion of the child welfare-
domestic violence tension is revealed by the early case law
from New York State regarding the implementation of
ASFA mandates. One resulting revision might be to alter
the provisions providing automatic termination of parental
rights or exceptions to the "reasonable efforts" requirement.
Indeed, these provisions do represent what would be a
common sense result for most cases. In cases like In re
Jonee, however, such blanket rules are exposed as unwork-
able and constitutionally inapplicable. A more appropriate
means of addressing the criminal record of a biological or
proposed foster/adoptive parent would be to employ the
method expressly advocated in In re Jonee, namely that of
"individualized determination."' This is a methodology
which the family court "can readily provide""9 and without
which "thousands of... children in [s]tate-supervised foster
care are subject to an arbitrary procedure that leaves their
fate to happenstance. Both the law and the courts owe them
more.
," 13 0
One possible construction of this proposed revision can
be drawn from the Model Code on Family Violence.' 13 In all
cases that deal with child welfare, the model code provides
that "[tihe court shall consider as primary the safety and
well-being of the child and of the parent who is the victim of
domestic or family violence ... [and t]he court shall con-
sider the perpetrator's history of causing physical harm,
bodily injury, assault, or causing reasonable fear ofphysical
harm, bodily injury, or assault, to another person.""2 It fur-
ther provides that the relocation of a parent due to domestic
violence shall not be used as a consideration against that
parent's rights.33
Such statutory language addresses the same concerns
embodied in ASFA but without the rigid application. As
stated in the commentary of this model, such provisions
recognize that abused parents "lack resources to provide for
the children outside the family home, or because they con-
128. In re Adoption of Jonee, 695 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1999).
129. Id. at 925.
130. Id. at 926.
131. See MODEL CODE ON DoMESTIC AND FAInLY VIOLENCE § 402 (National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges 1994).




clude that the abuser will hurt the children, the abused
parent, or third parties if the children are removed prior to
court intervention."3 " The flexible language of the model
statute allows it to account for all of these types of variables
when child welfare and domestic violence intersect. Family
court judges would not need to resort to refusal to apply law
nor would battered women, like Ms. Grant and Cynthia,
live in fear that past acts of self-defense might someday
deny them the ability to adopt.
Another amendment which should have been included
as part of NY-ASFA deals with the ongoing problem of con-
victing battered mothers for failure to protect the children.
A possible reform would be to add a defense of "reasonable
apprehension" to laws that make parental omissions to act
a crime.3 5 Such laws have already been implemented in
Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Iowa.' A reform like this one
would greatly reduce the tension between domestic violence
and child welfare laws, as it would "broaden the focus [of
the legal system] to include the mother's safety and recog-
nize the benefits of keeping the children with their non-
abuser."' 7
In addition to the removal of provisions establishing
automatic denials to adoptive and foster parents and those
provisions creating an automatic termination of parental
rights, perhaps the most effective change to NY-ASFA may
come out of the original legislation itself. As part of the
funding for the act, the state legislature set aside $100,000
to commission a study which will examine "the extent to
which persons who are victims of domestic violence have
their children removed from their homes in accordance with
[state law] due to the conduct of the perpetrator of such
domestic violence." 8 The report is to include suggestions
for statutory and regulatory reform in light of its findings. 9
That the study was commissioned at all is another indicator
that the role of domestic violence in many child welfare
134. Id. at 34.
135. Suzanne J. Groisser-Keller, Battered Women and Their Battered Chil-
dren: Criminal and Civil Allegations of the Woman's Failure to Protect in NAT'L
CTR. ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, supra note 12, at 87.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Family Court Act, supra note 4, ch. 7, § 56.1, at 136.
139. Id. The due date for the report is October 31, 2000. Id., ch. 7, § 56.2, at
136. It was not available as this comment was going to press.
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cases was contemplated by the legislature. How (or if) its
findings will translate into deconstructing the child welfare-
domestic violence tension remains to the seen.
140
Even assuming that necessary revisions are made to
ASFA and even with the new amendments to NY-ASFA, it
is evident that the broader difficulty of alleviating the child
welfare-domestic violence tension remains. It is in this area
of more substantive reform that ASFA is also notable for
what it lacks. "Beyond... errors in design, ASFA also re-
flects a broader failure of nerve: the failure to seek struc-
tural reform."'4' The proposals for such broader reform are
many. For example, the American Bar Association advo-
cated a number of other reforms in its report on domestic
violence and children.42 One proposal is to remedy the
problem that lawyers who practice child welfare law and
those who specialize in domestic violence cases generally
are in separate professional circles. The ABA proposes that
members of the bar nationwide "encourage and participate
in family violence/domestic violence training/knowledge for
court appointed guardians ad litem, court-appointed law-
yers, domestic relations attorneys generally, mediators, and
expert witnesses." Such training for practitioners would
provide a valuable foundation for enhanced cooperation and
more effective resolution of these cases. According to the
ABA report,
[alttorneys representing children [in a variety of child welfare ca-
pacities] ... and judicial personnel hearing these matters...
should be educated to: (1) better identify when children are victims
of or witnesses to domestic violence; (2) how to assure a thorough
investigation of the impact of such violence on these children; and
(3) how the legal system can best protect them from further vio-
140. Based on the statutory language describing the scope of the study, it
will be limited to examining only those cases in which children are removed
from homes in which domestic violence is inflicted upon the children and the
mother. At the very least, the results of that study would likely affirm the need
for the recent amendments to NY-ASFA.
141. Gordon, supra note 5, at 639. Gordon takes issue in particular with
ASFA's expected failure to address the "nonsensical" system in which states are
effectively rewarded through federal subsidies for keeping children in foster
care. Id. at 640, 689-94.





One visionary reform recognized by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice' would be the establishment of a "local,
multidisciplinary family violence coordinating council,"
which would act to coordinate the legal system and consider
input from health and social service agencies.46 Such coor-
dination would help to "ensure that the victim is not re-
abused by the system designed to protect her" and also bet-
ter ensure the child's safety. 147 '"Without adequate cross-
system training and appropriate supportive services, there
is justifiable fear among experts that simply increasing un-
derstanding of the links between domestic violence and
child abuse may lead to higher levels of inappropriate and
harmful intervention."' Amending ASFA to reflect a more
multi-disciplinary approach is a needed and realistic step
that would fit in to the legislation's broad goals of child
safety.
B. Models For Reform
There have been some successful efforts in the United
States to address the lack of coordination between child
protective services and domestic violence prevention which
ASFA cannot evade or ease. Each possesses the necessary
component of coordination of all relevant agencies and dis-
ciplines. One such model has been developed in the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, where the Department of So-
cial Services, or DSS, created a Domestic Violence Unit, or
DVU, as a component of its child protective services pro-
gram." Through the DVU, the state is able to provide con-
144. Id. at 5-6.
145. MARTHA B. WrrWER ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A COORDINATED
APPROACH TO REDUCING FAMILY VIOLENCE: CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHTS (1995).
146. Id. at 9.
147. Id. This and other reforms, such as that of the ABA, more realistically
reflect the fact that domestic violence and child safety are not distinct issues
with isolated effects. "The 1999 bundle of state laws [which comprise NY-ASFA]
profoundly affects all parties involved in New York's child welfare system in-
cluding families, social services agencies, practitioners and the judiciary."
Bradley, supra note 5, at 1, 4.
148. Bradley, supra note 5, at 360.
149. BLAMING THE VICTIM, supra note 82, at 21-22 (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: EMERGING PROGRAMS
FOR BATTERED MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 15 (1998)).
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sultation to caseworkers dealing with child welfare cases in
which there is domestic violence as well as "direct services"
to the abused mothers. 5 ° Offices of the DSS are staffed with
"interagency teams," including police officers, advocates for
battered women, court staff, hospital staff and other service
providers. 5' Also, staffing the DSS offices periodically each
week are domestic violence specialists.5 '
Under this coordinated program, the caseworkers are
mandated to identify the abuser in all documents relating
to their investigation of the case. 5 ' This, in effect, separates
the battered mother from the actions of the actual abuser.
"This mandate explicitly recognizes that battered mothers
have been erroneously labeled neglectful, when the actual
cause of the neglect is the perpetrator's behavior."54 The net
result of this effort has been a decrease in the number of
placements of children outside of their homes, as well as
helping DSS to more readily identify cases of domestic vio-
lence."
A second model which emphasizes the coordination of
efforts of various local agencies is in Jacksonville, Florida.
There, the Domestic Violence and Child Protection Collabo-
ration seeks to protect battered women and their children. 55
The collaboration project is comprised of the city's Depart-
ment of Children and Families, a local domestic violence
program, a local shelter, as well as area schools and neigh-
borhood organizations."57 This combined staff works to "in-
tervene with the dual goals of protecting the children and
the battered spouse and of holding the perpetrator respon-
sible."55 A particularly innovative component of this model
program is the "special condition" foster care placement
program. Under that program, a battered mother may vol-
untarily place her children in foster care for a maximum of
three months, thus allowing her to avoid neglect charges





155. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY
VIOLENCE: EMERGING PROGRAMS FOR BATTERED MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN
17 (1998).
156. Id. at 21.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 22.
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which could threaten her custody of the children altogether.
Both of these programs mirror the "multidisciplinary
council" approach advocated by the Department of Justice.
The evident successes of all of these model programs
throughout the country speak to the positive effect of elimi-
nating the tension between child welfare and domestic vio-
lence programs and of emphasizing cooperation among pro-
fessionals and local agencies.
There exists a model of reform in New York State which
significantly improves coordination of domestic violence and
child welfare efforts. In Orange County, the reforms are
based on the Massachusetts model. 9 A collaboration was
created between the Orange County Department of Social
Services and the Orange Safe Homes Project, in which a set
of options were mandated to be considered before children
are removed from their home.'60 The options to be consid-
ered are: "safety planning with mother and children, pre-
ventive services, DSS-initiated Order of Protection for the
children to vacate father from home, domestic violence shel-
ter, or assistance in obtaining an Order of Protection for
children and mother." 6' While such reforms may not all be
easily implemented at a national or statewide level under
ASFA and NY-ASFA, they at least represent the sorts of re-
forms necessary to enable this legislation to be effective.
CONCLUSION
While the Adoption and Safe Families Act may be well-
intentioned legislation designed to reduce the amount of
time spent in foster care and expedite the adoption process,
in certain circumstances it is regrettably a microcosm of the
often competing goals of child safety and protection against
domestic violence. What may have appeared to be com-
pletely unobjectionable provisions were exposed in the early
case law surrounding the legislation in New York State to
instead risk producing tragic outcomes for children and bat-
tered mothers alike. The resulting frustration led one fam-
ily law practitioner to chide the ASFA by saying, "these
laws sound great when you don't think very hard."' 2 Ulti-
159. BLAMING THE VICTIM, supra note 82, at 24.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Billingsley, supra note 53.
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mately, however, such harsh criticism is not entirely fair. It
is clear from the extended debate to pass NY-ASFA and the
language of law itself that domestic violence and its effects
on child protective services were under the contemplation of
the legislature. In re Jonee and Cynthia's case show that
absolute rules are simply not workable in family law and
that greater discretion to consider the problem of domestic
violence must be available. Also, legislation which fails to
mend the existing tensions between child welfare and do-
mestic violence laws does little to remedy the plight of bat-
tered women or their children.'63
Curing that tension involves reforms at several levels.
The first needed reform has already been made in New
York - the desperately needed elimination of the "irrebut-
table presumption"' and reinstitution of judicial discretion.
Meaningful reform in the areas of child welfare and domes-
tic violence also involve a systemic change. That change
may come in a variety of forms so long as the emphasis re-
mains to be the creation of a multidisciplinary approach to
child welfare and domestic violence cases. Such reforms
would make the legal system better prepared to handle the
tough cases in which those two issues co-exist.
164. It of course remains to be seen whether the recent changes to NY-ASFA
will alleviate that tension.
165. Significantly, this removal of the "irrebuttable presumption" clause
technically places New York State out of compliance with the federal law which
NY-ASFA was intended to implement.
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